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Consulting Revenue Sharing, Auditor Effort and Independence, 
and the Regulation of Auditor Compensation 
 
 
ABSTRACT: The joint provision of audit and non-audit services by audit firms 
to their audit clients has posed a threat to auditor independence. To mitigate the 
independence problem, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
issued a regulation (SEC 2003) that prohibits audit partners from receiving 
compensation for the sale of non-audit services to their audit clients. This study 
examines the effects of this regulatory change on the effort and reporting 
decisions of audit partners. We show that partners in an audit firm strategically 
change the firm’s liability-sharing rule. As a consequence, the regulation restores 
truthful reporting but has an undesirable negative effect on audit effort. The effect 
of the regulation on the welfare of the economy (defined as the total payoff to 
both audit firms and their clients) hinges on the tradeoff between the benefit of the 
regulation, which is derived from the inducement of truthful reporting, and the 
cost of the regulation, which results from less diligent audit work. We show that 
the regulation is more likely to increase the welfare in a strong legal regime 
(where the legal liability cost of auditor litigation is high) than in a weak legal 
regime. 
 
 
Keywords: Regulation of Auditor Compensation; Sharing Rules of Audit Firms; 
Auditor Effort; Truthful Reporting.  
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1. Introduction 
 Providing non-audit (consulting) services to audit clients continues to be a 
common practice for audit firms. For some clients, non-audit fees exceed the audit 
fees paid to their audit firms. The joint provision of audit and non-audit services 
can help an audit firm gain advantages as a result of the collaboration between the 
audit and consulting divisions within the firm. However, these advantages may 
also compromise auditor independence. For fear of losing large non-audit 
revenues, auditors may issue unwarranted audit opinions. 1  To address the 
independence problem, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
issued a regulation (SEC 2003, Section 2E) related to auditor compensation. This 
regulation “prohibits accounting firms from establishing an audit partner’s 
compensation or allocation of partnership ‘units’ based on the sale of non-audit 
services to the partner's audit clients.”2 The objective of this study is to examine 
the effects of this regulatory change on the effort and reporting decisions of audit 
partners. 
 To examine the issue of partner compensation, we develop a stylized 
model in which an audit firm (partnership) consists of an audit partner and a 
consulting partner that perform audit and consulting tasks, respectively, for audit 
clients (shareholders). The partners choose a (linear) sharing rule that determines 
how they share the audit and consulting fee revenues and the legal liability costs 
of auditor litigation. The consulting partner enjoys a competitive cost advantage 
over an outside consultant in performing the consulting task for the firm’s audit 
client. This is consistent with the notion that there are economies of scope in the 
provision of audit and non-audit services within an audit firm. These economies 
                                                 
1 Enron paid its auditor, Arthur Andersen, $27 million for consulting services in 2000, which 
accounted for more than half of the total fees that it paid to the audit firm (see Benston and 
Hartgraves 2002 and Kaplan 2004). These large consulting fees were likely to have created a 
serious conflict of interest for Arthur Andersen. 
2 See the SEC (2003) rule titled Strengthening the commission’s requirements regarding auditor 
independence. 
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of scope arise from the knowledge shared about the companies being audited and 
other infrastructural elements (SEC 2003, Section 4C-1a).3 
 When the audit firm’s consulting profit is less than the expected legal 
liability cost of an audit failure, auditor independence is not an issue, so the 
analyses focus on the opposite, more interesting case. In the case where the 
consulting profit exceeds the expected legal liability cost, the audit firm (i.e., 
partners as a whole) has an incentive to suppress evidence of financial 
misstatements and issue an unqualified opinion. This case provides an interesting 
setting to examine the issue of auditor independence and is particularly relevant in 
the light of actual observations. For instance, in a testimony before the U.S. 
Senate in 2002, the former SEC chairman Arthur Levitt commented that “As 
auditing becomes an ever-smaller portion of a firm’s business with an audit client, 
it becomes harder to assume that the auditor will challenge management when he 
or she should, if to do so might jeopardize a lucrative consulting contract for the 
auditor's firm.” Similarly, after being brought into Arthur Andersen to help 
overhaul the firm, the former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker concluded 
that the solution to the auditing crisis would be to provide audit clients with audit 
services only and nothing else (Revell 2003). Consistent with these comments, 
Congress and the SEC held the view that large consulting revenues would impair 
auditor independence and promulgated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002) and 
the SEC (2003) rules to help restore auditor independence. 
 The main findings of this paper are as follows. Even though the audit task 
and the consulting task are performed by different partners in an audit firm, the 
firm’s optimal sharing rule is such that the audit partner’s compensation must 
depend on the consulting revenues. This is explained by the fact that the firm’s 
optimal sharing rule induces the partners to take actions that maximize the firm’s 
                                                 
3 In this study, we refer “firm” to the audit firm and “company” to the company being audited. 
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overall payoff (which is the joint payoff of the partners). If the audit partner does 
not share any of the consulting revenues, then the personal payoff that the audit 
partner receives from a client will not fully incorporate the consulting profits (but 
the firm’s payoff will). As a consequence, the audit partner’s effort and reporting 
decisions will be sub-optimal from the firm’s point of view. Thus, the optimal 
sharing rule awards the audit partner an appropriate proportion of the consulting 
revenues to align the audit partner’s personal payoff with the firm’s payoff. Such a 
sharing rule induces the audit partner to select the effort level and reporting 
strategies that are optimal for the partnership as a whole. 
 Under the optimal sharing rule, the audit partner has an incentive to 
suppress evidence of misstatements in pursuit of consulting profits. The lack of 
auditor independence results in shareholders investing in companies that have 
issued misstated financial reports in which shareholders would not have invested 
had the auditor reported truthfully. This leads to a loss in the welfare of the 
economy (which is defined as the total payoff of audit firms and shareholders).4 
The lack of auditor independence provides the rationale for the government to 
intervene in the compensation structure of audit firms. 
The SEC (2003) regulation prohibits audit partners from receiving 
consulting fees. Conventional wisdom suggests that this regulation should induce 
auditors to report truthfully and work harder, as any advantages (i.e., consulting 
profits) of not finding and reporting evidence of misstatements are gone. Hence, 
                                                 
4 The lack of independence in a broader sense includes two issues. The first is the issue of an 
auditor exerting a low level of effort to verify a financial report (and thus being less likely to 
detect any material misstatement in it). The second issue is the lack of truthful reporting, or the 
adoption of a reporting strategy in which an auditor issues an unqualified opinion despite finding 
evidence of misstatements. Lack of independence in a narrow sense refers only to the latter 
reporting strategy. In this study, both independence issues (the auditor’s effort choice and reporting 
strategy) are examined, but the term “independence” refers only to “truthful reporting” to remain 
consistent with the use of the term in previous studies such as DeAnglo (1981), Magee and Tseng 
(1990), and Simunic (1984).  
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the welfare of the economy would increase. However, we find that while the 
regulation restores truthful reporting, it has an unexpected negative effect on audit 
effort.  
 The regulation has unintended consequences on audit effort because it is 
only concerned with the revenue-sharing rule, but not the liability-sharing rule. 
Our analysis shows that while the partners of the firm change their consulting 
revenue-sharing rule to comply with the regulation, they also strategically change 
their liability-sharing rule. Before the regulation was introduced, the audit partner 
suppressed evidence of misstatements for the companies to which the audit firm 
also supplied consulting services, and thus also received the consulting profits 
from those companies. After the regulation, the audit partner reports truthfully 
regardless of whether consulting services are provided. Truthful reporting causes 
the firm to forgo the consulting profits from the companies for which the audit 
partner has detected financial misstatements. To pursue profitable consulting 
businesses, the partners of the firm strategically change the liability-sharing rule 
to induce a lower level of audit effort by reducing the portion of legal liability that 
the audit partner must bear.  
The reduction in the audit partner’s effort allows the firm to pursue 
profitable consulting businesses, but results in an undesirable negative effect on 
the welfare of the economy. Therefore, whether the regulation improves welfare 
depends on the tradeoff between the welfare loss that is associated with the 
reduced audit effort and the welfare gain that is provided by the inducement of 
truthful reporting. We find that the regulation is more likely to increase welfare in 
a strong legal regime (where the legal liability cost of auditor litigation is high) 
than in a weak legal regime. When the legal regime is sufficiently strong, the 
effort-reducing effect of the regulation becomes insignificant compared with the 
welfare gain that is afforded by truthful reporting, which leads to an overall 
improvement in welfare. 
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The SEC (2003) regulation, however, contains the following modifier: 
“This rule does not preclude an audit partner from sharing in the profits of the 
overall firm…and an audit partner’s evaluation could take into account a number 
of factors directly or indirectly related to selling services to an audit client.5” 
While our main analysis assumes that the SEC regulation forces the audit partner 
to receive zero consulting revenues, we provide additional analysis in Section 4.1 
which shows that this modifier may allow an audit partner’s compensation to vary 
indirectly with the consulting revenues, thus causing the same independence 
problem as before the regulation. This implies that the effectiveness of the 
regulation depends on the ability of the regulatory body to forbid an audit 
partner’s compensation from varying with the consulting revenues either directly 
or indirectly. For the latter, the regulation should not allow audit partners to be 
evaluated based on selling non-audit services to audit clients. 
 The basic audit technology used in this study is the same as that used in 
Dye (1993, 1995), Schwartz (1997), and Pae and Yoo (2001). Whereas those 
studies assume truthful reporting to focus on the audit effort choice, this study 
considers both the effort and reporting decisions and characterizes how one 
depends on the other. Thus, in this study, the welfare of the economy may be 
impaired when the audit partner suppresses evidence of misstatements or makes 
insufficient effort in the performance of audits. This study is also related to that of 
Liu and Simunic (2005). Both studies consider the relationship between the 
partnership’s sharing rule and the production decisions of individual partners. 
Whereas Liu and Simunic (2005) examine the sharing rule between audit partners, 
this study focuses on the sharing rule between the audit and consulting partners 
and examines the effect of the regulation of auditor compensation on partner 
                                                 
5 “For example, an audit partner could be evaluated on the complexity of his or her engagements, 
the overall management of the relationship with an audit client including the provision of non-
audit services, and/or the attainment of explicit sales goals.” (SEC 2003, Footnote 178) 
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behavior.  
Chan (2009) also finds a decrease in auditor effort following regulatory 
changes. This study differs from Chan (2009) in two important ways. First, this 
study analyzes the regulation related to auditor compensation, whereas Chan 
(2009) analyzes a regulation that limits the scope of consulting services. Second, 
this study explores the effects of the sharing rule of audit firms on partner 
behavior, whereas Chan (2009) does not consider the sharing rule and treats the 
audit firm as a single auditor.  
 This study contributes to the literature that seeks to understand the 
implications of the SEC regulations that were formulated under SOX. The 
assumption underlying the SEC’s 2003 regulation on auditor compensation is that 
large non-audit services impair auditor independence. Most of the studies on non-
audit services focus on the validity of this assumption (e.g., Ascioglu, Hegde, and 
McDermott 2005, Asare, Cohen, and Trompeter 2005, Ghosh, Kallapur, and 
Moon 2009).6 There has been no prior study that offers a rigorous analysis of the 
impact of the SEC regulation on auditor behavior. Our study fills this gap in the 
literature. We show that if the assumption underlying the SEC regulation holds, 
i.e., if the large non-audit fees impair auditor independence, then the regulation 
restores truthful reporting but may have unintended consequences on auditor 
effort.7 Our results provide new insights into the effects of the regulation on 
auditor independence, auditor effort, and the welfare of the economy.  
 Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 shows the optimal (linear) sharing 
rules for audit firms, various decisions made by partners, and the welfare of the 
economy before and after the regulation of auditor compensation came into effect. 
                                                 
6 See Ascioglu, Hegde and McDermott (2005) for a literature review of the mixed empirical 
evidence on whether non-audit revenues impair auditor independence. 
7 Our unreported analysis also examines the alternative case, in which the SEC assumption does 
not hold, i.e., when the non-audit revenues do not affect auditor independence. In that case, while 
the SEC regulation (2003) on auditor compensation changes the firm’s sharing rule, it has no 
effect on audit partner behavior. 
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Section 4 provides relevant discussions. Section 5 concludes. A table of notations 
appears in Appendix A. All of the proofs appear in Appendix B. 
 
2. The Model 
We consider a one-period model in which two identical audit firms, Firms 
A and B, compete to provide audit and consulting services to n > 0 identical 
companies.8 Each audit firm is a partnership that consists of an audit partner and a 
consulting partner who perform audit and consulting tasks, respectively, under the 
name of their firm.9  All of the parties in the model are risk neutral, and the 
interest rate is normalized to zero.10  
 
2.1 Shareholders’ Investment Opportunities 
 Each of the n companies is owned by shareholders and operated by a 
manager. The continued operation of each company requires an investment of I > 
0 from its shareholders at the beginning of the period. The productivity of each 
company depends on its manager’s competence, which can be either high or low 
                                                 
8 The consideration of the oligopolistic competition of audit firms will make the paper more 
complex and less focused, but should not change the main results of the paper. For example, to 
consider industry specialization, a new stage can be added in which firms invest in the 
development of industry expertise before they set profit-sharing rules. In equilibrium, firms invest 
in different industry expertise, such that auditors from different firms specialize in auditing 
different companies as they have a cost advantage in auditing the companies in which they 
specialize (see Chan 1999). However, the main results of the paper, i.e., the choice of the sharing 
rule of audit and consulting partners within an audit firm and the results of the welfare analysis, 
should remain unchanged. 
9 In practice, an audit firm is often organized as a partnership in which the partners practice in the 
different divisions of auditing and consulting. While most of the national audit firms are limited 
liability companies (LLCs), the sharing rule among partners in an LLC is similar to that in a 
partnership.  In this study, the audit firms have sufficient wealth to cover legal payments ordered 
by a court. Relaxing this assumption will not qualitatively change our analysis, but requires 
relabeling the audit firm’s legal liability by the lower amount between the legal payment ordered 
by the court and the incorporated wealth of the audit firm. 
10 We assume risk-neutrality for tractability of analysis. The analysis will not be tractable with risk 
aversion as there are infinite contingencies to consider. This is a limitation shared by most of the 
analytical auditing papers, with only a few exceptions that focus on a few tractable events 
(Balachandran and Ramakrishnan 1987). 
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but is unknown to the shareholders. The common prior probability of the manager 
having a high level of competence is p ∈ (0, 1).  If the manager has a high level of 
competence, then the company will generate a cash flow of R > 0. In contrast, if 
the manager has a low level of competence, then the company will generate R 
with a probability of φ∈(0, 1) and zero with the complementary probability. If the 
shareholders do not make the required investment, they will liquidate the 
company and obtain a zero return.11 
We assume that a correctly stated financial report of the company would 
allow the shareholders to learn about the manager’s competence. A financial 
report, such as an income statement, reflects the past performance of the manager 
and therefore is a useful indicator of the manager’s competence. We further 
assume that the manager obtains personal benefits from the continued operation 
of the company and thus always presents to shareholders a financial report that 
indicates a high level of competence.12 In other words, the financial report of a 
highly competent manager is correctly stated, but that of an incompetent manager 
is misstated.  
 
2.2 Audit and Consulting Services 
Each company is mandated to hire an auditor to perform an audit to verify 
the credibility of the financial report that has been prepared by the manager.13 In 
our model, the audit client (i.e., the user of the auditor’s report) is the shareholders 
of the company. This is consistent with SOX, which mandates that the audit 
                                                 
11 Alternatively, we could assume that the liquidating value of the company is non-zero and varies 
with manager type, but this would complicate the notation without qualitatively affecting the 
analysis. 
12 Such personal benefits include the business experience and skills gained from operating a 
company, the diversion of cash flows from the company, and other job-related perks. The agency 
problem between the shareholders and the manager is exogenously assumed in this model. 
13 We assume a mandatory audit for simplicity. This assumption is innocuous as one can always 
find conditions under which the audit has a positive value in equilibrium.  
  10
committee (which represents the interests of shareholders) should be responsible 
for the hiring and firing of auditors.  
An audit can be viewed as a two-step process. In the first step, the audit 
partner expends effort on inspecting and analyzing the financial report, thereby 
obtaining evidence for the audit. Formally, let [0,1]e∈  be the audit (inspection) 
effort and ke2 be the cost of the audit effort, where k > 0. We adopt the common 
assumption in the audit literature (e.g., Dye 1993, 1995; Pae and Yoo 2001) that 
the audit technology is succinctly represented by the following conditional 
probabilities: 
 
( )
( )
Pr no evidence of mistatement | correct, 1, and
Pr evidence of misstatement | incorrect, .
e
e e
⎧ =⎪⎨ =⎪⎩
 (1) 
 
“Pr” denotes probability, “correct” means that the financial report is correctly 
stated, and “incorrect” means that the financial report contains material 
misstatements. In words, (1) states that if the financial report is correctly stated, 
the audit partner will not find evidence of misstatements. If the financial report is 
misstated, the probability that the audit partner will find evidence of 
misstatements increases with the inspection effort. 
 After the audit partner selects effort e but before issuing an audit opinion, 
a consulting task becomes known to the audit partner with a probability 
(0,  1)θ ∈ .14 We assume that the auditor selects audit effort before the consulting 
opportunity is known to capture the scenario in which the consulting opportunity 
                                                 
14 This assumption captures the scenario in which, in the course of doing business, the company’s 
management or auditor learns whether and how the company’s operations and information 
systems can be improved so that the company can operate more efficiently in the future. The 
management may seek the services of a consultant to make such improvements in the future. 
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is not fully anticipated when the auditor performs the audit.15 The consulting task 
will improve the profitability of the company if the shareholders decide to 
continue to operate the company by making a new investment. Specifically, we 
assume that the consulting task will generate a cash flow of π > 0 for the 
shareholders. We assume that φR+π < I < pR. This implies that, while a company 
is worth investing in when information about the type of manager is not known, it 
is not worth investing in, even with the benefits of consulting, if the shareholders 
know that the manager has a low level of competence.  
In the second step of the audit, the audit partner issues an opinion about 
the credibility of the financial report. When the audit partner obtains no evidence 
of misstatements, he will issue an unqualified opinion, as he cannot fabricate 
evidence to report otherwise. However, when the audit partner obtains evidence of 
misstatements, he has the option of either suppressing the evidence by issuing an 
unqualified opinion, or revealing the evidence by issuing a qualified opinion. In 
the latter case, the reason for the qualification must be shown in the audit report. 
Thus, a qualified opinion must indicate that the financial report contains material 
misstatements. Neither the audit partner’s effort nor the unreported audit evidence 
is publicly observable. 
After observing the audit opinion (i.e., the output of the audit), the 
shareholders decide whether to continue to operate or liquidate the company. The 
shareholders understand that the audit partner is strategic in both effort and 
reporting decisions, and take that into account when making investment decisions. 
The audit opinion offers a level of assurance, albeit imperfect, that the financial 
report is free of misstatements. The level of assurance can be interpreted as audit 
                                                 
15  Our unreported analysis under the alternative assumption that the auditor knows about 
consulting opportunities before selecting audit effort, shows that the essence of the main results of 
this study is not sensitive to this alternative assumption, except that the auditor will always report 
truthfully and the issue of auditor independence will be fully captured by the auditor’s effort 
choice. 
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quality. 
A few more assumptions about the consulting task are as follows. First, we 
assume that the output of consulting services, such as tax returns, accounting 
policy consultation, and various assessments and advice, is contractible. Second, 
we assume that the consulting partner has a cost advantage in performing 
consulting tasks for the firm’s audit clients over a consultant from outside the 
audit firm. This cost advantage stems from the sharing of information about the 
company that has been collected and documented by the audit partner. This 
information helps the consulting partner to understand the company’s 
organizational structures, operations, and accounting systems.16 Specifically, the 
effort cost of performing the consulting work is r by an outside consultant and v 
by the consulting partner, and π > r > v > 0. We assume that the knowledge 
transfer from audit partners to consulting partners is frictionless and costless 
within an audit firm.17 
Audit failure is defined as a situation in which the audit partner issues an 
unqualified opinion on a misstated financial report. A strict liability regime is 
assumed so that when the company fails, the audit firm is held liable for the audit 
failure.18 The company fails when its cash flow realized at the end of the period is 
                                                 
16 According to Statements on Auditing Standards No. 108 and 114 (AU§311), once an audit 
engagement has been accepted, the auditor must obtain sufficient knowledge about the company to 
understand the events and transactions that affect the financial report. This includes knowledge of 
the nature of the company’s business and industry, its accounting policies, levels of control, and 
other risks that are likely to cause accounting problems. This knowledge is necessary for the 
auditor to inspect the financial report effectively and will also help the consulting partner to 
perform consulting tasks. 
17 The alternative assumption that the internal knowledge transfer is costly for the audit partner 
will not qualitatively change the results of this study as long as the audit firm as a whole has a cost 
advantage compared with an outside consulting firm. 
18 For simplicity, we assume a strict legal liability regime. Our sensitivity analysis under the 
alternative assumption of a due care regime finds that the complexity of the analysis increases but 
the main insights offered in this paper remain unchanged. The details are not reported for brevity. 
Our model does not include deadweight litigation costs of shareholders and auditors. See Smith 
and Tidrick (1997) and Zhang and Thoman (1999) for the examination of the shareholders' 
litigation strategy and its impact on the auditor’s decision. 
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zero (without the benefit of consulting services) or π (with the benefit of 
consulting services). The legal payment for this failure by the audit firm to the 
client is denoted by l > 0.19  
 
2.3 Sharing Rules of Audit Partnerships 
In our model, an audit firm is not a person but a decentralized organization 
in which individual partners perform different tasks while sharing the audit and 
consulting fee revenues and the legal liability costs according to a sharing rule. At 
the beginning of the game, the audit partner and the consulting partner in each 
firm negotiate and choose an optimal sharing rule. The optimal sharing rule must 
maximize the firm’s overall payoff (which is the joint payoff of the partners), 
subject to the partners’ participation constraint that each partner must earn at least 
his reservation wage from the partnership. Without loss of generality, the 
reservation wage is assumed to be zero.20   
For tractability of analysis, we consider only linear sharing rules. 21 
Specifically, a partner’s compensation is held to be a linear function of various 
contractible performance measures, including audit fee revenues, consulting fee 
revenues, and legal liability costs. As clients are identical, we focus on the sharing 
                                                 
19 In practice, the magnitude of l depends on many institutional factors, such as the incorporated 
wealth of the audit firm and the strength of the legal regime.  
20  The optimal sharing rule must maximize the payoff for the partnership as a whole. To 
understand this, suppose that Rule X yields a higher firm payoff than Rule Y, but that the audit 
partner prefers Rule X and the consulting partner prefers Rule Y. Then, there is always an ex ante 
lump-sum transfer from the audit partner to the consulting partner, so that the consulting partner 
has no preference between Rule X and Rule Y and the audit partner still prefers Rule X. The ex 
ante lump-sum transfer has no incentive effects, i.e., it does not affect the production decisions of 
the partners and thus does not affect the firm’s overall payoff. 
21 As Coase (1937) suggested, a firm may not be able to write a contract based on all verifiable 
events because of the prohibitively high transaction costs involved in enforcing such a contract. 
This may explain why, in practice, firms use simple linear compensation schemes. In fact, many 
compensation formulas used in audit firms can be translated to linear sharing rules (see Liu 2002). 
For example, as shown in Section 4.1, the sharing rule that bases a partner’s compensation on the 
overall profit of the firm with variable incentive weights (partnership “units”) may be translated to 
a linear sharing rule with fixed incentive weights.  
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of the revenues and costs from a representative client. The partners’ compensation 
from a client engagement is described as follows. 
 
a a c c ly f f lα βλ γλ= + − , 
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )c a c c ly f f lα β λ γ λ= − + − − − , 
 
where 
ya: the audit partner’s compensation, 
yc: the consulting partner’s compensation, 
af : the audit fee, 
cf : the consulting fee, 
l: the legal liability cost, 
α : the audit partner’s share of the audit fee, 
β : the audit partner’s share of the consulting fee,  
γ : the audit partner’s share of the legal liability cost,  
λc: an indicator variable that equals one if a consulting task is obtained and 
 zero otherwise, and   
λl:  an indicator variable that equals one if auditor litigation occurs and zero 
 otherwise. 
 
In this sharing rule specification, the incentive weights α, β, and γ determine how 
the partners share the audit fee, consulting fee, and legal liability cost, 
respectively. Consistent with the common practice in the audit industry, the 
sharing rule is not observable to outsiders, including clients (shareholders) and 
other audit or consulting firms.22   
                                                 
22 This is a realistic assumption as an audit partnership is a private firm and little is known about 
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 The main objective of this study is to examine the effects of the SEC 
(2003) regulation that prohibits audit partners from receiving compensation based 
on the sale of non-audit services to the companies that they audit. This implies 
that in our model, the incentive weight of β is unrestricted prior to the SEC 
regulation, but is restricted to zero in the post-regulation period. 
 
2.4 Sequence of Events 
The events in the one-period model can be summarized as follows. At 
Stage 0, the audit partner and the consulting partner in each firm decide on their 
sharing rule.23 A partner will not participate in the game if his expected payoff is 
less than the reservation payoff of zero. At Stage 1, the audit partners from the 
two firms submit bids to the shareholders in competition for audit engagements. 
The audit fee fa is determined by competition. At Stage 2, each audit partner 
expends effort for each audit engagement obtained. At Stage 3, for each company, 
a consulting task (if it exists) becomes known to the audit partner. At Stage 4, 
each company’s auditor issues an audit opinion. At Stage 5, the shareholders 
decide whether to invest in or liquidate a company depending on the audit opinion. 
Given the assumption that pR > I > φR+ π, we know that the shareholders will 
invest in a company with an unqualified opinion and liquidate a company with a 
qualified opinion. The game for a company ends here if the shareholders liquidate 
the company, but proceeds to the next stage if they decide to invest in it. At Stage 
6, if a consulting task exists, then the shareholders choose between the consulting 
partner of the audit firm and an outside consultant to perform the consulting task. 
The consulting fee fc is also determined by competition. Finally, the cash flow of 
                                                                                                                                     
the details of the partnership sharing rule. If the sharing rule were observable to the general public, 
then the firm would choose the sharing rule that induces the partner actions that maximize the 
welfare of the economy (i.e., the joint payoffs to shareholders and the audit firm), rather than 
maximizing the firm’s payoff. In that case, auditor independence would not be an issue.  
23 We do not allow sharing rule renegotiation after Stage 0 since auditor effort is not observable or 
contractible. 
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each company is realized, and legal payments are made from the audit firm to the 
shareholders if the company fails. Partners of each firm are then compensated 
according to the sharing rule that was established at the beginning of the game. 
The model structure is common knowledge. The stages of the game are illustrated 
in Figure 1 for easy reference. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 Here.] 
 
2.5 Equilibrium Concept 
 As the firm’s sharing rule is not observable to people outside the firm, the 
game is a dynamic game with imperfect information. We solve the game for a 
perfect Bayesian equilibrium with pure strategies (see Tirole 2002, 438, for the 
definition of the equilibrium). Note that the partners of each firm compete with 
different players at different stages of the game. The audit partner competes with 
the rival audit partner when bidding for an audit task at Stage 1, and the 
consulting partner competes with a rival consultant when bidding for a consulting 
task at Stage 6. The following assumptions are made regarding the bidding 
strategies. First, as in Grossman (1981) and Hurter and Lederer (1986), 
“incredible threats” are eliminated by assuming that a player will not bid a price 
that is below his break-even price. Second, prices are restricted to non-negative 
values. Third, to avoid dealing with ε -equilibrium (see Tirole 2002, 234), the 
following technical assumption is made in the case of a tie in price. When two 
players bid the same price for a task, the player with the lower break-even price 
wins the bid; when their break-even prices are the same, the player with the lower 
production cost wins the bid; and when both their break-even prices and 
production costs are the same, the two players have an equal chance of winning 
the bid. 
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3 Analysis 
3.1 Optimal Partner Decisions before the Regulatory Change 
 In this section we assume that all partners always act in the interest of their 
firm as a whole, and derive the optimal partner decisions for the firm. Under this 
assumption, the partners choose actions to maximize the firm’s overall payoff, 
which is the sum of the payoffs of the individual partners of the firm. Of course, 
the partners will not make optimal decisions without a proper incentive structure. 
The incentive structure considered in this study is the firm’s sharing rule. The 
discussion of the optimal sharing rule is deferred until the next section. 
When a consulting task arises for an audit client, given that r > v, and the 
assumed tie-breaking rule, the consulting partner of the audit firm will submit his 
best offer, r, and win the bid for the consulting task. Hence, the firm’s payoff from 
a consulting task is (r – v), which equals the cost advantage enjoyed by the 
consulting partner over an outside consultant. Suppose that (1 )r v lϕ− ≤ − , i.e., 
the future payoff from consulting, (r – v), is less than the expected legal liability 
cost of an audit failure, (1 ) lϕ− , then acting in the best interest of the firm, the 
audit partner reports truthfully. 24  Thus, in this case the issue of auditor 
independence is mute. The focus of our analysis is on the other more interesting 
case, where 
 
(1 )r v lϕ− > − .25                 (2) 
 
                                                 
24 We assume that when indifferent between reporting policies, the auditor will report truthfully. 
25 r is large. Consulting services have grown rapidly in the accounting profession since the mid-
1970s, and by 2000, the Big Five audit firms had expanded into multidisciplinary service firms 
that earned more than half of their gross fees from non-audit services. See Zeff (2003) and Wyatt 
(2003) for a historical review of the development of non-audit services in the accounting 
profession and their effect on auditor independence. 
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We will maintain this assumption in the following analysis.26 In this case, when a 
consulting task arises and the audit partner finds evidence of misstatements, the 
payoff to the firm of issuing an unqualified opinion is r – v – (1 )lϕ−  > 0, and that 
of issuing a qualified opinion is zero. Hence, from the firm’s point of view, the 
audit partner should suppress evidence of misstatements and issue an unqualified 
opinion in the presence of a lucrative consulting task. Given this reporting 
strategy, Figure 2 depicts the game tree for the effort choice problem.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 here.] 
 
The optimal audit effort minimizes the firm’s cost of the audit, denoted by C: 
 
2
[0,1]
Min (1 )[(1 ) ](1 ) ( )
e
C ke p e e l r vθ ϕ θ∈ = + − − + − − − . (3) 
 
From (3), the cost of the audit is equal to the audit effort cost, plus the expected 
legal liability cost, minus the expected consulting profit. To ensure an interior 
solution for the effort, i.e., (0,  1),e∗ ∈  we assume (1 )(1 )(1 ) / 2k p lθ ϕ> − − − . 
Solving the first-order condition for (3) yields the optimal audit effort: 
 
1
(1 )(1 )(1 ) ,
2
p le
k
θ ϕ∗ − − −=  (4) 
 
where the subscript 1 refers to the solution before the regulatory change.27 As 
expected, the optimal audit effort, *1e , increases with the expected legal liability, 
                                                 
26 Our unreported analysis finds that in the opposite case where lvr )1( ϕ−≤− , while the SEC 
regulation (2003) on auditor compensation changes the firm’s sharing rule, it has no effect on 
partner behavior. 
27 The second-order condition is satisfied because k > 0. 
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(1 )lϕ− , or the probability of the manager’s misreporting, (1 – p), but decreases 
with the effort cost parameter, k, or the probability of the existence of a consulting 
task, θ. However, with an opportunistic audit reporting strategy, audit effort is not 
a function of the consulting profit, (r – v), as long as (r – v) is greater than (1 )lϕ− .    
  
3.2 Optimal Sharing Rule before the Regulatory Change 
The previous section shows the optimal partner decisions for the firm. 
However, partners make decisions to maximize their personal payoffs, not 
necessarily the payoff of the firm as a whole. Indeed, at the start of the game the 
partners have to negotiate and agree on a sharing rule to induce the firm’s desired 
partner behavior. Lemma 1 below characterizes the sharing rule that induces the 
optimal partner decisions for an audit engagement that has been obtained.  
 
Lemma 1: Given that an audit firm is engaged to perform an audit for a given fee, 
the unique values of β and γ are characterized by 1 ( ) /r v rβ ∗ = −  and 1 1γ ∗ = , 
respectively, such that the partners of the firm are induced to make decisions to 
maximize the firm’s payoff (minimize the firm’s cost) for the audit for any given 
values of r, v, and (1 )lϕ− . 
 
Lemma 1 shows that a simple sharing rule that comprises 1 ( ) /r v rβ ∗ = −  
and 1 1γ ∗ = motivates the partners to choose the firm’s desired actions. To see how 
this simple sharing rule works, let us first consider the consulting partner’s 
bidding strategy when a consulting task arises. Given *1 1{ , },β γ∗  the consulting 
partner’s break-even price for the consulting task is 1/(1 )v rβ ∗− = , the same as the 
firm’s break-even price. As a result, the consulting partner will win the bid with 
the price of r and the firm’s consulting payoff achieves a maximum of (r – v) in 
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competition. 
Next, let us move one step back to consider the auditor’s reporting 
decision. Given any audit evidence, the sharing rule *1 1{ , }β γ∗  equates the audit 
partner’s personal payoff with the firm’s payoff, i.e., 1 1 (1 )r lβ γ ϕ∗ ∗− − =  r – v – 
(1 )lϕ− . Accordingly, the audit partner is induced to adopt the optimal reporting 
strategy for the firm. Specifically, when the audit partner finds evidence of 
misstatements, he issues an unqualified opinion if a consulting task exists (as 
1 1 (1 )r lβ γ ϕ∗ ∗> − ), and issues a qualified opinion otherwise.  
Finally, let us move one further step back to see how the sharing rule 
*
1 1{ , }β γ∗  induces the audit partner to expend the optimal level of effort for the 
firm in the performance of an audit. In contrast to the firm’s objective function (3), 
the audit partner’s objective is to choose the level of effort that minimizes his own 
personal cost, which is denoted by c: 
 
2
[0,1]
Min (1 )[(1 ) ] (1 )
e
c ke p e e l rθ γ ϕ θβ
∈
= + − − + − − .    (5) 
 
Comparing (3) with (5), we see that when 1 ( ) /r v rβ ∗ = −  and 1 1γ ∗ = , the 
objective functions of the audit partner and the firm coincide. This implies that the 
audit partner will expend the optimal level of effort from the firm’s point of view. 
 Before equilibrium is derived, let us consider how the shareholders choose 
an auditor. As the firm’s sharing rule is not observable to outsiders, the 
shareholders choose an auditor based on the observed audit fee and their 
conjecture about the firm’s sharing rule. Note that for any given audit fee, the 
optimal sharing rule for the firm is the one that induces the partners to choose 
actions that minimize the firm’s audit cost. In the belief that the firm uses the cost-
minimizing sharing rule, the shareholders expect to obtain a fixed amount of gross 
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benefit (before the audit fee) that is determined by the induced partners’ actions.28 
Thus, the shareholders hire the least costly auditor for the fixed benefit, i.e., the 
auditor that has submitted the lowest audit bid. This reasoning indicates that when 
the firm’s sharing rule is unobservable to the shareholders, the auditor cannot use 
different audit fees to creditably signal differing audit quality (i.e., a differing 
assurance level that the financial report is free of misstatements). Given that the 
shareholders will choose the auditor that bids the lowest audit fee, Proposition 1 
characterizes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 1: The following constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 
(a) Each firm uses a dominant sharing rule against the rival firm. In particular, 
each firm has a unique sharing rule that is characterized by 1 1α∗ = , 
1 ( ) /r v rβ ∗ = − , and 1 1γ ∗ =  that is a dominant compensation strategy against 
the rival firm for any given values of r, v, and (1 )lϕ− .  
(b) The shareholders choose the auditor who bids the lowest audit fee, and have 
no preference between auditors if they bid the same fee. 
(c) For any observed audit fee (including an off-the-equilibrium fee), the 
shareholders believe that the firm uses a sharing rule that minimizes the firm’s 
audit cost. 
 In equilibrium, each firm bids the audit fee of 1 1 1( , )
af C β γ∗ ∗ ∗= , has an equal 
expected share of the audit market 2/][ nnE i = , where i ∈ {A, B}, and 
performs consulting tasks for its audit clients for the consulting  fee of 1
cf r∗ = . 
  
  The intuition for the optimality of the sharing rule 1 1 1{ , , },α β γ∗ ∗ ∗  as 
                                                 
28 The gross benefit of an audit equals the expected savings of the wasteful investment in a 
company with a misstated report, plus the expected legal payment that is received from the audit 
firm. 
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characterized in Proposition 1, is straightforward. We know from the explanation 
of Lemma 1 that the sharing rule ( 1 1, )β γ∗ ∗  motivates the partners to make 
decisions to minimize the firm’s audit cost during Stages 2-6. Furthermore, given 
1 1 1{ , , }α β γ∗ ∗ ∗ , the audit partner’s break-even price for an audit engagement equals 
the firm’s cost, i.e., 1 1 1 1 1( , ) / ( , )c Cβ γ α β γ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗= . Accordingly, the audit partner’s 
bidding strategy at Stage 1 is also optimal from the firm’s point of view. In sum, 
the sharing rule 1 1 1{ , , }α β γ∗ ∗ ∗  is optimal because it induces the partners to make 
decisions to maximize the firm’s overall payoff by aligning the partners’ personal 
payoffs with the firm’s payoff during Stages 1-6 of the game.  
It is noteworthy that the firm’s cost minimization through the choice of 
1 1 1{ , , }α β γ∗ ∗ ∗  ensures that the audit partner can submit the most competitive 
(winning) audit bid, and that no one partner could demand a change in the sharing 
rule and be better off. For example, if the consulting partner wanted an increase in 
his share of the consulting fee (i.e., a decrease in β), then the audit partner would 
not win the competition for an audit as his personal cost in (5) (and also his break-
even price) would increase. As a consequence, the consulting partner would lose 
the bid for the consulting contract.  
In equilibrium, the audit fee equals the firm’s cost of an audit and is given 
by 
 
 21 1 1 1 1 1( , ) (1 )[(1 ) ](1 ) ( ).
af C ke p e e l r vβ γ θ ϕ θ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗= = + − − + − − −    
 
The equilibrium audit fee decreases with the consulting payoff (r – v), which is 
consistent with actual observations. For instance, a former Arthur Young audit 
partner, Mr. Chapin, stated “we have been told that some companies are offering 
audits – their exclusive franchise – at big discounts to attract clients for their more 
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lucrative consulting services. Some say the profession’s traditional function has 
been downgraded to a loss leader” (CPA Journal 1992). 
In equilibrium, the audit partner’s expected payoff from a client is zero as 
the equilibrium audit fee is equal to the audit partner’s break-even price. 
Specifically, the expected payoff of the audit partner from a client is 
 
2
1 1 1 1 1 1(1 ) (1 ) 0.
a cf f p l keα θβ γ ϕ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗+ − − − − =  
 
The consulting partner’s expected payoff from a client is also zero:  
 
 1 1 1 1 1(1 ) [(1 ) ] (1 )(1 )(1 ) 0.
a cf f v p lα θ β γ ϕ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗− + − − − − − − =  
 
 It is also noteworthy that in equilibrium the audit partner shares the 
consulting revenue (i.e., 1β ∗ > 0), even though the consulting task is solely 
performed by the consulting partner. This result follows from the fact that it is in 
the firm’s best interest to suppress any evidence of misstatements and issue an 
unqualified opinion in the presence of a lucrative consulting task. If the audit 
partner does not share the consulting revenue, then his personal payoff will not 
incorporate the potential consulting profit. Therefore, the audit partner’s actions 
will be incompatible with the firm’s interests. Specifically, if 1β ∗ = 0, the audit 
partner will report any evidence of misstatements despite the existence of a large 
consulting profit, and the audit partner’s effort choice will be sub-optimal from 
the firm’s point of view. In contrast, 1β ∗ = (r – v )/r helps to align the audit 
partner’s personal payoff with the firm’s payoff, thereby inducing the audit 
partner to make the optimal effort and reporting decisions for the partnership as a 
whole.  
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The above analysis shows that when the future consulting payoff is 
relatively large, i.e., r – v > (1 )lϕ− , the optimal sharing rule induces the audit 
partner to suppress evidence of misstatements to pursue large consulting profits.29 
This possibility of untruthful reporting provides the rationale for the government 
to intervene in the compensation structure of audit firms. 
 The reason behind the audit firm’s lack of independence is that future 
consulting opportunities for audit firms depend on audit reports. Magee and Tseng 
(1990, Propositions 1-4) show that the auditor’s quasi-rent from audit tasks does 
not generally lead to a compromise in auditor independence.30 Our model and 
analysis differ from Magee and Tseng (1990) in the assumption about whether 
auditors’ future contracts are contingent on audit reports. In their setting, clients 
cannot offer report-contingent audit contracts to auditors. The client cannot 
commit to firing an auditor who provides an unfavorable audit report. Such a 
threat is incredible because it is optimal for the client to continue with the 
incumbent auditor after the audit report is issued, when the incumbent auditor can 
bid a lower audit fee than external auditors. In our setting, auditors’ future 
consulting opportunities will depend on their audit reports. A company (project) is 
not worth continued operation (investment) when a qualified audit report is issued, 
hence any potential consulting profits will be lost if the audit report is unfavorable. 
This seeks to capture the situation where clients have some control over the 
                                                 
29 This result is consistent with the observation that although Arthur Andersen knew that the audit 
team had been given a low evaluation – 2 marks out of a total of 5 – for the audit work for Enron, 
the headquarters of Arthur Andersen did not take any action to “rock the boat” (see the indictment 
by the U.S. government against Arthur Andersen at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usandersen030702ind.html). 
30 If the lack of auditor independence is due to the auditor’s fear of losing the audit contract/profit, 
and the consulting profit alone does not lead to the auditor’ untruthful reports, then the SEC 
regulation would have no impact on auditor behavior, because it did not address the root cause of 
the problem. Our results would not be qualitatively affected if the lack of auditor independence is 
due to both the audit and consulting profits, but the audit profit alone is not sufficiently large to 
cause the auditor to issue false reports. 
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“existence” of consulting opportunities. In reality, the clients’ management 
normally has private information about whether and where consulting services are 
needed to improve the operations of the business and can thus use such consulting 
opportunities as “bribes” to auditors.  
 
 3.3 Government Intervention in the Compensation Structure of Audit Firms 
 To help restore auditor independence, the SEC issued a regulation related 
to auditor compensation in 2003 (SEC 2003, Section 2E). Under this regulation, 
an audit partner is deemed not to be independent from the companies he audits if 
he is also receiving compensation from the sale of non-audit services to the same 
companies. Thus, the regulation demands that an audit partner’s compensation not 
be based on the sale of non-audit services to these companies. Following the spirit 
of this regulation implies that, in our model, the audit partner’s incentive weight 
for the consulting revenue, β, is restricted to zero. We now examine the effects of 
this regulation on the partners’ decisions and the welfare of the economy. 
 It is noteworthy that SOX (Section 201) and the SEC (2003) rule (Section 
2B) prohibit auditors from providing their audit clients with nine categories of 
non-audit services, including, for example, bookkeeping and internal audit control 
outsourcing services. Auditors are still allowed to provide other services that are 
regarded as not directly producing financial statement numbers, such as tax 
consulting and general management consulting services. New consulting 
opportunities for audit firms arise in the post-SOX period, which help client 
companies to comply with internal control reviews and more complex disclosure 
requirements imposed by SOX. Thus, r in (2) remains large in the post-regulation 
period. To isolate and focus on the effects of the SEC regulation of auditor 
compensation, in the main analysis we make a comparison between the pre- and 
post-regulation situations under the assumption that the scope of non-audit 
services remains the same after the regulation. Later in Section 4.4, we discuss 
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how the analytical results of the model will be affected if we also consider the 
SEC’s restriction on the scope of non-audit services.  
 Proposition 2 characterizes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium after the 
regulatory change, which is denoted by the subscript 2. To ensure that 2 (0,  1),e
∗ ∈  
we assume (1 ) ( )l r vϕ θ− > − . 
   
Proposition 2: Under the regulation that requires β = 0, a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium is characterized as follows. 
(a) Each audit firm uses a dominant sharing rule against the rival firm. In 
particular, each firm has a unique sharing rule that is characterized by 
2 2
2 2
( , ) ( )
2 ( , )
1C p r v
C
β γ θ
β γα
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
+ −∗ = > , 2 0β ∗ = , and (1 ) ( )2 (1 ) (0,1)l r vlϕ θϕγ − − −∗ −= ∈  that is a dominant 
compensation strategy against the rival firm for any given values of r, v, and 
(1 )lϕ− . The optimal auditor choice and posterior beliefs of shareholders are 
the same as those in Parts (b) and (c) of Proposition 1. In equilibrium, each 
firm bids the audit fee of 2 2 2( , )
af C β γ∗ ∗ ∗= , has an equal expected share of the 
audit market 2/][ nnE i =  where i ∈ {A, B}, and performs consulting tasks for 
its audit clients for the consulting fee of 2
cf r∗ = . 
(b) The audit partner reports truthfully, yet adopts a level of audit effort that is 
lower than that before the regulation, i.e., 
2 1(1 )[(1 ) ( )] / 2e p l r v k eϕ θ∗ ∗= − − − − < . 
 
Proposition 2 shows that the partners of each audit firm will react to the 
regulation strategically by changing the firm’s optimal sharing rule. As the audit 
partner is not allowed to receive variable pay based on consulting revenue, 
namely, 2 0β ∗ = , the audit partner will issue a qualified opinion when he detects 
material misstatements. This means that the regulation restores truthful reporting.  
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If the firm’s liability-sharing rule remains unchanged, one might expect the audit 
partner to work harder because any advantages (i.e., consulting profits) of not 
finding and reporting evidence of misstatements are gone, and hence the welfare 
will improve after the regulation. However, our analysis reveals that the partners 
strategically change the firm’s liability-sharing rule such that the audit partner will 
actually expend less effort after the regulation ( 2 1e e
∗ ∗< ).  
 The reason for the change of the liability-sharing rule and the reduced 
audit effort is as follows. Before the regulation, the audit partner suppressed 
evidence of misstatements for the companies for which the audit firm also 
supplied consulting, and thus also received the consulting profit from these 
companies. After the regulation, the audit partner issues a qualified opinion for 
any company in which he finds evidence of misstatements, regardless of the 
existence of a consulting task. This causes the firm to forgo the consulting profit 
from the companies in which the audit partner detects financial misstatements. In 
response, the partners optimally change to a sharing rule that induces a lower 
level of audit effort to pursue consulting profits that could be forgone if the effort 
level were the same as before the regulation. More specifically, the optimal 
liability-sharing rule reduces the portion of legal liability that the audit partner 
must bear ( 2 1γ ∗ < ), and thus the audit partner has less incentive to work hard. The 
idea behind the reduced effort is that the audit partner’s personal benefit from 
putting in effort to avoid an audit failure decreases if his share of the legal liability 
cost decreases (while his consulting partner pays a higher “tax”), therefore the 
audit partner will optimally choose a lower level of audit effort. The audit effort 
becomes 2 (1 )[(1 ) ( )] / 2 ,e p l r v kϕ θ∗ = − − − − which is lower than  
1 (1 )(1 )(1 ) / 2e p l kθ ϕ∗ = − − −  prior to the regulation.  
The new audit-fee-revenue sharing rule is greater than one, i.e., 
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2 2 2 2 2[ ( , ) ( )] / ( , ) 1C p r v Cα β γ θ β γ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗= + − > . The reason is as follows. The firm’s 
audit cost incorporates the (minus) expected consulting profit; however, the audit 
partner’s personal cost does not as he does not share the consulting revenue. As a 
result, the audit partner’s personal cost of the audit is greater than the firm’s 
cost.31 Therefore, to align the audit partner’s break-even price with the firm’s cost, 
a larger incentive weight for audit fee revenue is given to the audit partner 
(i.e., 2 1 1α α∗ ∗> = ). As a consequence, the audit partner is induced to bid 
aggressively below his personal cost in the interests of the partnership as a whole.   
In equilibrium, the audit partner’s expected payoff from a client is zero, as 
the equilibrium audit fee equals the audit partner’s break-even price.  Specifically, 
the expected payoff of the audit partner from a client is 
 
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2[ (1 )(1 )] (1 )(1 ) (1 ) 0.
a cf p p e f p e l keα θβ γ ϕ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗+ + − − − − − − − =  
 
The consulting partner’s expected payoff from a client is also zero:  
 
 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
(1 ) [ (1 )(1 )] [(1 ) ]
(1 )(1 )(1 )(1 ) 0.
a cf p p e f v
p e l
α θ β
γ ϕ
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗
− + + − − − −
− − − − − =  
 
The consulting profit (r – v) that is earned by the consulting partner is transferred 
to the audit partner through the sharing of the legal liability cost ( 2 1γ ∗ < ) and the 
audit fee ( 2 1α∗ > ). The profit is then transferred to clients through competitive 
bidding for the audit tasks.  
                                                 
31 As is shown in the proof of Proposition 2, 2 2 2 2( , ) ( , ) ( )C c p r vβ γ β γ θ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗= − − , where 2 2( , )C β γ∗ ∗  is 
the firm’s cost of an audit, 2 2( , )c β γ∗ ∗  is the audit partner’s personal cost, and ( )p r vθ −  is the 
consulting profit that can be expected from a company that has issued a correctly stated financial 
report.   
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 Thus far, we have not introduced any welfare implications for the change 
of regulation. To allow welfare comparisons, we define the welfare of each client 
and audit firm pair as the sum of the expected payoffs of the shareholders of the 
company and the audit firm. Because the expected payoff of the audit firm is zero, 
the welfare equals the shareholders’ expected payoff.  As expected, both the audit 
partner’s reporting and effort decisions come into play in determining the welfare 
effect of the SEC (2003) regulation of auditor compensation, which is shown in 
Proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3:  The regulation improves the welfare of each client and audit firm 
pair if 2
1 2
( )
(1 )[(1 ) ]
r vl σϕ θ σ σ
−
− − +≥ , where 1σ  ≡ ( )I R vϕ π− − −  and 2σ  ≡ ( )I R vϕ θ π− − − . 
 
As shown in Proposition 2, the optimal sharing rule and the audit partner’s 
effort and reporting decisions change in response to the regulation. On the one 
hand, the regulation restores truthful reporting, which helps to improve the 
investment decisions of shareholders and thus enhances welfare. On the other 
hand, the audit partner’s effort decreases, which has a negative effect on welfare. 
Whether the regulation improves welfare depends on which of these two effects 
dominates. 
Proposition 3 shows that the regulation improves welfare if the legal 
liability cost of auditor litigation is sufficiently large, i.e., 2
1 2
( )
(1 )[(1 ) ]
r vl σϕ θ σ σ
−
− − +≥ . The 
reason is as follows. When the legal liability cost is sufficiently large, the effort-
reducing effect of the regulation becomes the secondary factor.32 As a result, the 
welfare loss due to the reduced effort is outweighed by the welfare gain that is 
afforded by truthful reporting, which leads to an overall improvement in welfare. 
                                                 
32 Note that 1 2 (1 ) [ (1 ) ] / 2e e p r v l kθ ϕ∗ ∗− = − − − −  decreases with l. 
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When the legal liability cost is small, however, the regulation can result in a lower 
level of welfare, as the effort-reducing effect of the regulation can be the 
dominant factor.  
In summary, although the regulation of audit compensation restores 
truthful reporting, it has an unintended negative effect on audit effort. The welfare 
effect of the regulation depends on the strength of the legal regime (as 
characterized by the magnitude of the expected legal liability l). In a strong (weak) 
legal regime where the truthful-reporting effect (the effort-decreasing effect) is 
likely to be the dominant factor, the regulation can lead to an overall increase 
(decrease) in welfare. 
To gain further insights into the condition in Proposition 3, i.e., 
2
1 2
( )
(1 )[(1 ) ]
r vl σϕ θ σ σ
−
− − +≥ . We note that 2σ  ≡ ( )I R vϕ θ π− − −  represents the expected 
shareholder loss from an audit failure. If the legal regime is characterized by the 
out-of-pocket liability/damage measure, the expected legal liability from an audit 
failure will be set to equal the expected shareholder loss from the audit failure, i.e., 
2(1 )lϕ σ− = , which means 21l σϕ−= . If this is the case, then it can be shown that a 
sufficient condition for the inequality 2
1 2
( )
(1 )[(1 ) ]
r vl σϕ θ σ σ
−
− − +≥  to hold is that 2 r vσ > − . 
In other words, under the out-of-pocket liability/damage regime where l is as large 
as 21
σ
ϕ− ,  the SEC regulation (2003) will improve the welfare of the economy when 
the expected shareholder loss from an audit failure, 2σ , exceeds the audit firm’s 
rent from consulting services, r v− .  
 
4. Further Discussions 
4.1 Sharing in the Overall Profit Pool and the Effectiveness of the Regulation 
 Our model assumes a linear sharing rule. In practice, a partner’s 
compensation is sometimes a proportionate share of the firm’s overall profits, 
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which include profits from audit and non-audit services. A partner’s share in the 
overall profits is often labeled as “units”, which can vary based on the evaluation 
of the performance of the partner. However, suppose we set the partner’s units to 
be yi / (overall firm profit), i = a, c, where yi is the partner’s compensation as 
defined in Section 2.3, then it is easy to see that the units-based sharing rule is 
actually equivalent to the linear sharing rule as specified in Section 2.3. In other 
words, when the partners share in the overall profit of the firm, the firm can 
choose an appropriate incentive weight (i.e., performance varying “units”) such 
that a partner’s compensation can vary with the audit fee, the consulting fee, and 
the legal liability cost in the same way that is dictated by the linear sharing rule. 
As explained in the Introduction, the SEC compensation rule (2003, 
Section 2E) contains a modifier that neither precludes an audit partner from 
sharing in the profit pool of the overall firm, nor precludes the audit firm from 
evaluating an audit partner based on factors related to the sale of non-audit 
services. The above analysis shows that allowing the partner’s share in the firm’s 
overall profits to vary with consulting revenues would have a similar effect on 
partner compensation to allowing the incentive weight of β in a linear sharing rule 
to be non-zero. Therefore, this modifier to the rule may allow an audit partner’s 
compensation to be based on the consulting revenues to circumvent the intended 
goal of the regulation, causing the same independence problem as before the 
regulation.  
Hence, the effectiveness of the SEC rule hinges on the ability of the 
regulatory body to ensure that the audit partner’s compensation does not vary with 
the consulting revenues. This requires prohibiting audit partners from directly 
sharing the consulting revenues from their audit clients, or their performance pay 
from indirectly depending on selling consulting services to their audit clients.33  
                                                 
33 In the comment letter addressed to the SEC in January 2003, the former SEC chief accountant 
Lynn Turner expressed the similar view that audit partners should not be evaluated based on the 
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4.2 Economies of Scope in Audit Firms  
 In this study, the economies of scope in the joint provision of audit and 
non-audit services by the audit firm are that the client knowledge documented by 
the audit partner can be shared with the consulting partner. Thus, the consulting 
partner enjoys a competitive cost advantage over an outside consultant in 
performing a consulting task. The output of consulting services, such as tax 
returns, accounting policy consultation, and various assessments and advice, is 
assumed to be contractible. In other words, there are no motivational issues with 
respect to the consulting partner’s tasks (except his bidding behavior). This is 
consistent with the SEC’s view on the economies of scope in audit firms (see SEC 
2003, Section 4C-1a) and that the consulting arm of the audit firm is largely a 
source of revenues for the audit firm when establishing the SEC’s 2003 rules. In 
this context, the “moral hazard problem” between the partners in the audit firm is 
resolved by the optimal sharing rule that they contract on at the start of the game.  
We have tried alternative models in which more complex cooperation in 
production is required between the partners of the firm, such that there is no 
sharing rule that perfectly aligns the partners’ payoffs with the firm’s payoff to 
resolve the firm’s moral hazard problem. We find that the model and analysis 
become more complex and entail simulation and numerical analysis. However, 
our results regarding the change in the liability-sharing rule and the auditor’s 
effort may not change as shown in the following example. 
 
Example 1: In our model, we make an additional assumption that the consulting 
partner also participates in the audit. That is, the consulting partner’s expertise 
and effort, denoted by a, can help the audit partner in the performance of the audit 
task. In particular, we assume that the probability of finding evidence of 
                                                                                                                                     
success in selling non-audit services to their audit clients (see 
http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74902/lturner1.htm). 
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misstatements in a misstated financial report is (e + ea). The marginal cost of the 
audit partner’s (consulting partner’s) audit effort is k1 (k2). The simulation of the 
analysis uses the following arbitrary parameter values: p = 0.5, φ =0.05, θ = 0.2, l 
= 3.16, I = 9, R= 20, π = 7, r = 6, v = 1, k1 = 2, and k2 = 4. It can be shown that 
the optimal sharing rules before and after the regulation are {β1* = 0.48, γ1* = 
0.96} and {β2* = 0, γ2* = 0.586}, respectively. The effort choices before and after 
the regulation are {e1* = 0.2885, a1* = 0.0017} and {e2* = 0.2199, a2* = 0.0006}, 
respectively.  
 
 In the above example, while the optimal sharing rule does not perfectly 
align the partners’ payoffs with the firm’s payoff for the audit efforts a and e, the 
liability-sharing rule γ is reduced to induce less audit effort after the regulation. 
This is consistent with our results in Section 3. 
 
4.3 Alternative Regulatory Interventions to Restore Truthful Reporting 
 The current model focuses on the SEC (2003) regulation related to auditor 
compensation and does not consider alternative regulatory intervention to restore 
truthful reporting. For example, the government could prohibit audit firms from 
performing any consulting services at all for the companies that they audit. It can 
be shown that, under such a regulation, auditors will report truthfully and their 
effort levels will become higher than when consulting services are allowed, as 
audit firms have no incentive to hold back audit efforts when consulting profits 
are gone and the audit service becomes the sole product. However, such a 
regulation would eliminate the audit firm’s economies of scope in the joint 
provision of audit and consulting services. Therefore, whether the shareholders 
would be better off depends on the tradeoff between the benefit gained from 
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truthful reporting and the lost economies of scope for non-audit services.34  
 
4.4 Joint Consideration of the SOX Restriction (2003) on the Scope of Non-
Audit Services 
 Data from Audit Analytics show that the average ratios of non-audit fee to 
total fee for publicly traded companies are 0.42, 0.39, and 0.29 for the pre-SOX 
years of 2000, 2001, and 2003, respectively. In contrast, the average ratios of non-
audit fee to total fee are reduced to 0.15, 0.14, and 0.14 for the post-SOX years of 
2007, 2008, and 2009, respectively. This reduction in non-audit fee ratio is mainly 
caused by the restriction on the scope of non-audit services imposed by SOX 
(Section 201) and the SEC (2003) rule (Section 2B). Here, we discuss how the 
analytical results of the current model are affected if we also consider the SEC’s 
restriction on the scope of non-audit services.  
 There are two possible situations. First, the scope of the non-audit service 
is reduced to such an extent that the new consulting rent becomes less than the 
expected loss of an audit failure in the post-SOX period. In this case, the auditor 
will report truthfully and his effort level also becomes higher in the post-SOX 
period, because the expected consulting rent for the audit firm is insignificant 
compared with the expected litigation cost. This has a positive effect on the 
welfare of the economy. However, there is also a welfare loss, because the 
regulation that reduces the types of non-audit services restricts the audit firm’s 
economies of scope related to these services. The shareholders would be better off 
if this loss is insignificant compared with the welfare gain from the truthful 
reporting and greater auditor effort.  
                                                 
34 This alternative regulation would have the same effect as if the shareholders could commit ex 
ante to not hiring the same audit firm for potential future consulting services. However, sequential 
rationality dictates that the shareholders would not honor such a commitment unless there were 
mechanisms to force them to do so. 
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 The second situation is that the scope of the non-audit service is reduced 
by a small amount such that the new consulting rent remains greater than the 
expected loss of an audit failure in the post-SOX period. This case is similar to the 
current model. The auditor will report truthfully, but his effort level becomes 
smaller than that in the pre-SOX era. However, this reduction in effort is 
mitigated by the fact that there is less consulting rent for the audit firm to pursue, 
due to the restriction on the scope of non-audit services. In the welfare analysis, 
the tradeoff will be between the welfare gain from truthful reporting and the 
welfare loss from both the reduced auditor effort and the loss of economy of 
scope related to the prohibited non-audit services. 
 In summary, the regulation that reduces the scope of non-audit services 
will introduce a loss of economy of scope related to the disallowed services. To 
the extent that the new consulting rent remains greater than the expected loss of 
an audit failure in the post-SOX era, the joint consideration of this other 
regulation will not qualitatively affect the key results of this study regarding the 
SEC’s regulation on audit firms’ sharing rules.  
 
4.5 Ethical Values and Reputational Concerns of Auditors 
 
 The ethical values of auditors are not included in the model. Our one-
period model also abstracts from auditors’ reputational concerns. The 
consideration of ethics and reputation would not qualitatively affect our results 
insofar as the incentives for truthful reporting (including the expected legal 
liability cost, ethnical values, and reputational concerns) are less significant 
compared with the consulting profits. To see this, note that our analysis is a 
change analysis, i.e., we examine the change in auditor behavior induced by the 
SEC regulation. As ethics and reputational concerns remained the same before 
and after the regulation, they do not have interactions with the effects of SEC 
regulation on auditor behavior.  
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 The issue of auditor independence would disappear if auditors held 
sufficiently high moral standards and had significant concerns for reputation. Our 
analysis is useful in the situation where the ethnical values and reputation 
considerations were not sufficient to deter auditors from giving false opinions, 
which means that the issue of auditor independence was not mute prior to the SEC 
regulation. We believe that our model captures some of the realities that led to the 
recent regulatory reforms related to the auditing industry.  
 
5. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 This study examines the interactions among the SEC’s regulation of 
auditor compensation, the sharing rules of audit firms, and the partners’ various 
decisions. We focus on the case where the expected legal liability cost of audit 
failure is less than the profit from a potential future consulting task. We find that 
the optimal sharing rule awards the audit partner a proportion of the firm’s 
consulting revenues to induce the audit partner’s effort and reporting decisions 
that maximize the firm’s collective interests. However, the optimal sharing rule 
also induces a lack of truthful reporting by the audit partner and results in a 
welfare loss. To restore truthful reporting, the SEC (2003) regulation prohibits 
audit firms from compensating audit partners based on consulting revenues. 
However, we show that this regulation can induce the partners in the audit firms 
to strategically change the way liability cost is shared, which results in a lower 
level of audit effort. We further show that this regulation can improve the welfare 
of the economy (i.e., the total payoff to shareholders and audit firms) if the legal 
liability cost of auditor litigation is sufficiently large. In this case, the welfare gain 
from the inducement of truthful reporting outweighs the welfare loss from the 
reduction of audit effort in the performance of audits.  
 Our findings have implications for regulators. Although the legal payment 
made by the audit firm to the client (shareholders of the company) in the event of 
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audit litigation is determined by the court, the liability born by individual partners 
within the firm is determined by the partnership agreement. In this regard, the 
liability exposure of individual partners is at the firm’s discretion through the 
firm’s liability-sharing rule. Regulators such as the SEC and Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) might have the access to the partnership 
agreement as they need to enforce the regulation on the audit firm’s sharing rule. 
This study may bring to the attention of regulators the unexplored impact of the 
regulation on the firm’s liability-sharing rule and the auditor effort.  
 One limitation of this study is that we consider only the effects of 
knowledge spillover from auditors to consulting partners. In practice, the 
knowledge spillover can be bi-directional. High quality audits may lower the 
consulting cost, and the consulting partners’ work, in turn, may benefit auditors in 
future audits, as auditors can also share the consulting-generated knowledge.35 
The exploration of this bi-directional knowledge spillover and the sharing rules 
that would induce more complex partner cooperation in audit partnerships are 
interesting avenues for future research. 
                                                 
35 We thank a reviewer for making this point. 
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Appendix A: Table of Notation 
 
in  = the number of companies audited by Firm i, where i ∈ {A, B};  
I = the required investment for the continued operation of a company; 
p = the probability of a manager being highly competent; 
R = the cash flow generated from a company with a highly competent manager; 
ϕ = the probability that a company with a less competent manager generates a 
cash flow of R; 
π = the cash flow generated from the consulting task for the shareholders; 
e = the audit effort of an auditor; 
k = the marginal cost of audit effort; 
θ = the probability of the existence of a consulting task; 
v = the effort cost of performing the consulting task by the consulting partner; 
r = the effort cost of performing the consulting task by an outside consultant; 
l = the legal payment made by the audit firm to the shareholders in the case of 
auditor litigation; 
ya = the audit partner’s compensation; 
yc = the consulting partner’s compensation; 
af  = the audit fee; 
cf  = the consulting fee; 
λc = indicator variable that equals one if the auditor obtains the consulting task 
and zero otherwise;   
λl:  = indicator variable that equals one if auditor litigation occurs and zero 
otherwise, 
α  = the audit partner’s share of the audit fee; 
β  = the audit partner’s share of the consulting fee; 
γ  = the audit partner’s share of the legal liability cost; 
c = the audit partner’s expected personal cost of an audit; 
C = the firm’s expected cost of an audit; and 
W = the welfare of each client and audit firm pair. 
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Appendix B: Proofs 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
 Given that an audit partner is engaged to perform the audit for a given fee, 
we search for a sharing rule that induces the partners to take the actions that 
maximize the firm’s payoff (i.e., minimize the firm’s cost) for the audit. 
(a) The consulting partner’s bidding strategy 
 At Stage 6, if a consulting task arises, the client chooses the consultant 
who bids the lowest fee for the task. Note that the upper bound of the payoff that 
the firm can obtain from the competition for the consulting task is (r – v), which is 
the difference in the cost of the task performed by an outside consultant or the 
consulting partner. The sharing rule that induces a bidding equilibrium that allows 
the firm to achieve the upper bound of payoff must satisfy 
( ) /r v rβ ≤ − .  (B1) 
For any given sharing rule, ( ) /r v rβ ≤ − , the consulting partner’s break-even 
price for the consulting task is less than or equal to the competitor’s cost, i.e., 
/(1 )v rβ− ≤ . Given this sharing rule and the correct conjecture of the sharing 
rule by the outside consultant, the unique pair of equilibrium bidding strategies is 
that both players bid r, and the consulting partner wins the bid because his break-
even price (or the production cost) is smaller. The sharing rule ( ) /r v rβ ≤ −  
constitutes a bidding equilibrium, because the firm cannot gain a greater 
consulting payoff by unilaterally changing the sharing rule, and neither can the 
outside consultant be better off by changing the bid of r. In equilibrium, the firm’s 
consulting payoff achieves the upper bound of r – v > 0.  However, if 
( ) /r v rβ > − , then the audit firm will lose the bid for the consulting task. 
(b) The audit partner’s reporting strategy 
 At Stage 4, the audit partner issues an unqualified opinion when he finds  
no evidence of misstatements. When the audit partner detects a misstatement, the 
  43
reporting strategy that maximizes the firm’s payoff is to issue a qualified opinion 
if, and only if, a consulting task exists. To induce the audit partner to use this 
optimal reporting strategy, the sharing rule { , }β γ  must satisfy the following 
conditions: 
0 (1 )lγ ϕ≤ − , if no consulting task exists; (B2) 
(1 )r lβ γ ϕ> − , if a consulting task exists where r – v > (1 – φ)l. (B3) 
(c) The audit partner’s effort choice 
 At Stage 2, the optimal level of effort, which maximizes the firm’s payoff 
(i.e., minimizes the firm’s cost) of the audit, is determined by solving (3). As 
shown in the main text, the optimal effort level is 
1
(1 )(1 )(1 )
2
p le
k
θ ϕ∗ − − −= .  
In contrast, the audit partner chooses effort to solve (5). If the audit partner’s 
effort choice is interior, then it equals 
k
lpe
2
)1()1)(1(
1
ϕγθ −−−=+ .   
Clearly, to induce the audit partner to expend the optimal level of effort (i.e., 
1e
+ = 1e∗ ), we require that *1 1γ = . Given that *1 1γ = , the only β that satisfies (B1)-
(B3) for any given values of r, v, and (1 )lϕ−  is  1 ( ) /r v rβ ∗ = − . In other words, 
{ 1 ( ) /r v rβ ∗ = − , 1 1γ ∗ = } is a unique sharing rule that induces the optimal partner 
behavior for the firm for any given values of r, v, and (1 )lϕ− . Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 Because the companies are identical and independent, considering the 
game for just one company suffices. Suppose that the shareholders of the 
company choose the auditor who bids the lowest audit fee, which will be shown 
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later as the shareholders’ equilibrium strategy. Let af  be an auditor’s break-even 
price for the audit. Consider the set of sharing rules 
T= 1 1{ , , | ( , ) / ( , ), ( , ) ( , ), ( , ) 0}c C C C cα β γ α β γ β γ β γ β γ β γ∗ ∗= = >  for an audit 
firm, where C is the firm’s cost of the audit (see (3)) and c is the audit partner’s 
personal cost of the audit (see (5)). For any given sharing rule { , , }α β γ ∈T, the 
firm’s cost of the audit is minimized, and the audit partner’s break-even price 
equals the firm’s cost, i.e., /af c α= =C. Hence, the audit partner always bids in 
the interest of the firm in the competition for the audit task. It follows that the 
sharing rule maximizes the firm’s payoff against any strategy of the rival firm. 
The steps taken to show that T is a set of dominant compensation 
strategies are outlined as follows.36 Fix a sharing rule 1 1 1{ , , }α β γ ∈T.  First, we 
can show that 1 1 1{ , , }α β γ dominates any sharing rule 2 2 2{ , , }α β γ ∈ 
{ , , | 0,α β γ α > 1 1( , ) ( , ),C Cβ γ β γ∗ ∗>  ( , ) 0}c β γ > . The method is to show that 
there exists a biding strategy of the rival auditor such that the sharing rule 
1 1 1{ , , }α β γ  yields a strictly greater payoff for the firm than 2 2 2{ , , }α β γ  does. 
Second, using a similar method, we can show that 1 1 1{ , , }α β γ  dominates any 
sharing rule 3 3 3{ , , }α β γ ∈{ , , | 0 ( , ) / ( , ),c Cα β γ α β γ β γ< ≠ 1 1( , ) ( , ),C Cβ γ β γ∗ ∗=  
( , ) 0}c β γ > . Third, we can show that 1 1 1{ , , }α β γ  dominates any sharing 
rule 4 4 4{ , , }α β γ ∈ { , , | 0 or ( , ) 0}cα β γ α β γ≤ ≤ . Since 1 1 1{ , , }α β γ  is arbitrarily 
chosen from the set T, we know that T is a set of dominant compensation 
strategies for the firm. 
 Clearly, the audit partners from the two firms that use dominant sharing 
rules have the same break-even price, which equals the firm’s cost. Thus, the 
                                                 
36 Details of the steps are omitted here for brevity, but are available from the author upon request 
(the detailed proof is provided to the editor and reviewers in the reviewer appendix). 
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unique bidding equilibrium at Stage 1 is that the two audit partners bid the same 
audit fee that is equal to the firm’s cost, i.e., 1 1 1( , )
af C β γ∗ ∗ ∗= . Given our assumed 
tie-breaking rule, the audit partners have an equal chance of winning the bid. This 
implies that the two partners have the same expected share of the audit market. 
Also note that a dominant sharing rule constitutes a bidding equilibrium for the 
consulting task at Stage 6, in which the consulting partner wins the task with the 
price ∗cf1 = r. 
 From the shareholders’ perspective, choosing the auditor who bids the 
lowest fee is the optimal strategy, given their posterior belief that an audit firm 
uses a sharing rule that minimizes the firm’s cost of the audit. This posterior belief 
can be derived from the firm’s equilibrium strategies based on Bayes’ rule. We 
observe that on the equilibrium path 1 1 1 1Pr ( , ) ( , ), ( , ) 1
aC C f Cβ γ β γ β γ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗⎡ ⎤= = =⎣ ⎦ . 
Hence, conditional on the observed equilibrium audit fee 1 1( , )
af C β γ∗ ∗ ∗= , the 
shareholders’ posterior belief 1 1 1 1Pr ( , ) ( , ) | ( , ) 1
aC C f Cβ γ β γ β γ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗⎡ ⎤= = =⎣ ⎦  obeys 
Bayes’ rule. 
 The above arguments show that the firms’ dominant sharing rules (from 
the set T) and the shareholders’ strategies and beliefs that are specified in Parts (b) 
and (c) of Proposition 1 constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 
 Finally, note that 1 1 1{ , , }α β γ∗ ∗ ∗ ∈ T, where 1 ( ) /r v rβ ∗ = − , 1 1γ ∗ = , and 
1 1 1 1 1( , ) / ( , ) 1c Cα β γ β γ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗= = . Furthermore, Lemma 1 shows that 1 1{ , }β γ∗ ∗  is a 
unique sharing rule that minimizes the firm’s cost of an audit for any given values 
of r, v, and (1 )lϕ− .  Together, these imply that 1 1 1{ , , }α β γ∗ ∗ ∗  is a unique sharing 
rule that is a dominant compensation strategy for an audit firm for any given 
values of r, v, and (1 )lϕ− . Q.E.D.  
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Proof of Proposition 2 
 Given that an audit firm is engaged to perform the audit for a given fee, 
we search for a sharing rule that can induce the partners of the firm to take actions 
that minimize the firm’s expected audit cost. 
(i) The consulting partner’s bidding strategy 
As shown in the proof of Lemma 1, the sharing rule rvr /)(02 −<=∗β  
constitutes a bidding equilibrium at Stage 6 in which the consulting partner wins 
the consulting task with the bid at r. The audit firm’s payoff from the consulting 
task achieves the upper bound of (r – v). 
(ii) The audit partner’s reporting strategy 
At Stage 4, given that the audit partner detects a misstatement and a 
consulting task exists, the auditor’s expected payoff from the client if he issues an 
unqualified opinion is (1 ) (1 )r l lβ γ ϕ γ ϕ− − = − − , as 0β = . Note that γ  must be 
positive in equilibrium, because if 0γ ≤ , then the audit partner would bear no 
legal liability cost and thus have no incentive to exert effort in the performance of 
the audit, in which case the audit would have zero value. Hence, (1 ) 0lγ ϕ− − < , 
which then implies that the auditor always reports truthfully. 
(iii) The audit partner’s effort choice 
 The effort level that minimizes the firm’s cost is determined by solving the 
following problem: 
2
[0,1]
Min (1 )(1 )(1 ) [ (1 )(1 )] ( ).
e
C ke p e l p p e r vϕ θ
∈
= + − − − − + − − −  (B4) 
The optimal level of effort is  
2
(1 )[(1 ) ( )]
2
p l r ve
k
ϕ θ∗ − − − −= . 
Note that 2 0e
∗ > , since by assumption (1 ) ( )l r vϕ θ− > − . Moreover, 2 1 1e e∗ ∗< <  
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since (1 ) ( ) (1 )(1 )l r v lϕ θ θ ϕ− − − < − − . This proves Part (b) of Proposition 2, as 
2e
∗  can be induced by the new sharing rule (1 ) ( )2 (1 )
l r v
l
ϕ θ
ϕγ − − −∗ −= . To see this, note that 
the audit partner’s effort choice is determined by solving the following problem: 
2
[0,1]
Min (1 )(1 ) (1 ) .
e
c ke p e lγ ϕ
∈
= + − − −  (B5) 
The audit partner’s optimal effort choice is  
2
(1 ) (1 )
2
p le
k
γ ϕ+ − −= . 
Clearly, the audit partner is induced to make the firm’s optimal effort choice only 
when (1 ) ( )2 (1 )
l r v
l
ϕ θ
ϕγ − − −∗ −= . Furthermore, comparing (B4) and (B5) reveals that if 
2 0β ∗ =  and (1 ) ( )2 (1 )l r vlϕ θϕγ − − −∗ −= , then 2 2 2 2( , ) ( , ) ( )c C p r vβ γ β γ θ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗= + − . Thus, the 
audit-fee-revenue-sharing rule, α , that equates the audit partner’s break-price 
with the firm’s audit cost is 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( , ) / ( , ) [ ( , ) ( )] / ( , ) 1c C C p r v Cα β γ β γ β γ θ β γ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗= = + − > . Based on the 
same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1, we can show that the sharing rule 
that is characterized by 2 2 2 2 2[ ( , ) ( )] / ( , )C p r v Cα β γ θ β γ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗= + − , 2 0β ∗ = , and 
(1 ) ( )
2 (1 )
l r v
l
ϕ θ
ϕγ − − −∗ −=  is the firm’s dominant compensation strategy for any given values 
of  r, v, and (1 )lϕ− . Other equilibrium results follow the same arguments as in 
the proof of Proposition 1. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
The welfare of each client and audit firm pair before the regulation is 
given by 
2
1 1 1 1[ ( ) ] (1 )(1 )[ ( ) ] (1 ) [ ( ) ] .W p R v I p e R v I p e R v I keθ π ϕ θ π θ ϕ π∗ ∗ ∗≡ + − − + − − + − − + − + − − −
The audit partner’s effort and reporting decisions change in response to the 
regulation. As a result, the welfare changes to 
  48
2
2 2 2[ ( ) ] (1 )(1 )[ ( ) ]W p R v I p e R v I keθ π ϕ θ π∗ ∗≡ + − − + − − + − − − . 
The change of welfare brought by the regulation is then given by 
2 1
2 2
1 1 2 1 2(1 ) [ ( )] (1 )( )[ ( )] ( ).
W W W
p e I R v p e e I R v k e eθ ϕ π ϕ θ π∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Δ ≡ −
= − − − − − − − − − − + −  
Observe that 0 < 1σ  ≡ ( )I R vϕ π− − − ≤ 2σ  ≡ ( )I R vϕ θ π− − − . Since 
2 2
1 2( )e e
∗ ∗− > 0, a sufficient condition for WΔ > 0 is that 1 1 1 2 2( ) 0e e eθσ σ∗ ∗ ∗− − ≥ . 
This inequality holds if and only if 2
1 2
( )
(1 )[(1 ) ]
r vl σϕ θ σ σ
−
− − +≥ . To see this, note that 
substituting 1 (1 )(1 )(1 ) / 2e p l kθ ϕ∗ = − − −  and 
2 (1 )[(1 ) ( )] / 2e p l r v kϕ θ∗ = − − − − into 1 1 1 2 2( ) 0e e eθσ σ∗ ∗ ∗− − ≥  and simplifying 
terms yield37 
 
 1 2(1 ) {(1 )(1 ) [ (1 ) ] } 0
2
p l r v l
k
θ θ ϕ σ ϕ σ− − − − − − − ≥  
 
 1 2 2(1 ) [(1 ) ] ( ) 0l r vϕ θ σ σ σ⇔ − − + − − ≥  
 
 2
1 2
( ) .
(1 )[(1 ) ]
r vl σϕ θ σ σ
−⇔ ≥ − − +  
 
Therefore, the change of welfare, WΔ , is positive when 2
1 2
( )
(1 )[(1 ) ]
r vl σϕ θ σ σ
−
− − +≥ .  Q.E.D. 
                                                 
37 Also note that 0θ > , 0 <  p  < 1, and k > 0. 
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Figure 1: Timeline of the Game 
 
Stage 0: 
(Start of the period) 
 
Partners in each firm decide on a sharing rule. 
 
Stage 1: Audit partners from the two firms submit bids to the shareholders in 
competition for audit engagements. 
 
Stage 2: Each audit partner expends effort for each audit engagement that is 
obtained. 
 
Stage 3: For each company, a consulting task (if it exists) becomes known to 
the audit partner. 
 
Stage 4: Each company’s auditor issues an audit opinion. 
 
Stage 5: Shareholders decide whether to invest in or liquidate a company 
depending on the audit opinion. 
 
Stage 6: For each company in which shareholders decide to invest, if a 
consulting task exists, then the shareholders choose between the 
consulting partner of the audit firm and an outside consultant to 
perform the consulting task. 
 
 
End of the period: The return of each company is realized, and legal payments are made 
from the audit firm to the shareholders if the company generates a 
low return.  
 
Partners are compensated according to the pre-determined sharing 
rule. 
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FIGURE 2: The Game Tree for the Audit Firm’s Effort Choice Problem Given that (r – v)>(1– φ)l 
Correct Report
[p]
Incorrect Report
[1−p]
No Evidence of 
Misstatement
[1]
No Evidence of 
Misstatement
[1−e]
Evidence of 
Misstatement
[e]
Consulting Task
[θ]
No
 Consulting Task
[1−θ]
Consulting Task
[θ]
No 
Consulting Task
[1−θ]
Consulting Task
[θ]
No 
Consulting Task
[1−θ]
Unqualified 
Opinion
[1]
Unqualified 
Opinion
[1]
Unqualified 
Opinion
[1]
Unqualified 
Opinion
[1]
Unqualified 
Opinion
[1]
Qualified 
Opinion
[1]
Investment
[1]
Investment
[1]
Investment
[1]
Investment
[1]
Investment
[1]
No Investment
[1]
Nature Moves
Auditor Moves
Nature Moves
Auditor Moves
Shareholders Move
The Firm’s
Cost of
the Audit: 2 ( )ke r v− − 2ke 2 (1 ) ( )ke l r vϕ+ − − − 2ke2 (1 )ke lϕ+ −
* The numbers in square brackets represent probabilities
2 (1 ) ( )ke l r vϕ+ − − −
 
